Ebola and War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Avoiding Failure and Thinking Ahead by Gostin, Lawrence O. et al.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2018 
Ebola and War in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Avoiding 
Failure and Thinking Ahead 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
Matthew M. Kavanagh 
Georgetown University Law Center, mk1915@law.georgetown.edu 
Elizabeth Cameron 
Nuclear Threat Initiative 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2113 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3296529 
 
JAMA (Online First), Nov. 29, 2018, at E1-E2. 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the International Humanitarian Law Commons 
Ebola andWar in the
Democratic Republic of Congo
Avoiding Failure and Thinking Ahead
The Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) is exceptionally dangerous, occurring
within active armed conflict and geopolitical volatility,
including a million displaced persons. With 421 cases,
240deaths, and thenumbers increasing, thisEbolaout-
break is the second deadliest in history.1 Recent spread
to Butembo, home to 1.2 million people, raised con-
cerns. TheDRC,WorldHealthOrganization (WHO), and
partners are leading a vigorous international response,
yet despite deploying an experimental vaccine, cases
doubled in October 2018 and many cases had un-
known origin.
Uncontrolled Ebola outbreaks can expand quickly,
as occurred in West Africa in 2014. Averting that out-
come in the DRC requires rapid action including a
strengthenedpublichealth response, security, andcom-
munityoutreach. If violenceescalates, it could compro-
mise a fragile response. Yet resources are insufficient.
The United States and other countries are not permit-
ting personnel deployment to the epicenter, including
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and US Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID).
In this Viewpoint, we review recommendations of
experts convenedbyGeorgetownUniversity and listed
at the endof this article. TheUnited States and interna-
tional community should launchhigh-level politicalmo-
bilization, with diplomatic, human, and economic re-
sources. It is critical to recognize that futurehealthcrises
will occur in fragile, insecure settings. Toprepare, the in-
ternational community needs long-term planning and
enhanced capacities to improve the safety and effec-
tiveness of epidemic response operations.
Public Health Amid Active Conflict
Contact tracing,medical isolation, ringvaccination, and
investigational treatments are being deployed in the
DRC. It is vital to reach all infectedpeople andminimize
their time with illness in the community. Of 137 con-
firmed cases between October 28 and November 26,
only 19were found throughcontact tracing, 32wereon
contact lists but lost to follow-up, and 83 (61%) had no
known links to confirmed cases. Those without known
links to previous cases averaged 7 days between onset
of symptomsand isolation;peoplewhodied in thecom-
munity averaged 9.7 days with symptoms.1 These data
suggest contact tracing and vaccination have not pre-
ventedcascadingtransmission.Morethan30healthcare
workershavebeen infected.Communitydistrust isdeep
afterdecades-longhumanitarian crises, impeding infor-
mation-sharing and cooperation.2
On October 17, the WHO’s Emergency Committee
determined the outbreak did not constitute a public
health emergencyof international concern (PHEIC) un-
der the International Health Regulations. Days later,
armed rebels reportedly killed 19 people and kid-
napped 12 children in the outbreak epicenter.2 The Al-
liedDemocraticForces (ADF)haveconductedmorethan
20 lethal attacks, severely disrupting the response, as
have localMai-Maimilitias.TheUnitedNations (UN)Sta-
bilizationMissionoffersprotectiontorespondersbuthas
been ineffectual in stemming ADF attacks; its reputa-
tion among communities remains problematic. On No-
vember 8, the WHO and UN pledged enhanced secu-
rity operations.3 Yet, lethal attacks have persisted.
Gaps in the Response
The WHO and partners are leading an energetic inter-
national responsedespiteadversity.TheWorldBankhas
dispatched financing, while US-supported vaccines,
therapies, and laboratory/epidemiology capacity-
building areprovingessential. TheWHO’sHealthEmer-
gencies Program and contingency fund—restructured
since theWestAfrica epidemic—providevital tools. Yet,
theWHO has neither themandate nor capacity to fully
cope with insecurity and societal alienation.4
Foreignhealthworkerswithnongovernmentalorga-
nizationsandUNagencies are currently tacklingEbola in
NorthKivu, DRC, alongside local personnelwhooffer vi-
talexperienceandlinguisticandculturalawareness.How-
ever, significantcapacitygapsremain insurveillance,data
analysis, laboratories, and clinical response, particularly
experienced personnel to expand the response and ro-
tate teams. Responders need greater capacity to work
with local leaders to build community trust and commu-
nication. The DRC’s second Strategic Response Plan re-
quested$62millionthroughJanuary,which,whilenotyet
fullyfunded, is likely insufficient if theepidemicescalates.5
Increased security is essential. On October 30, UN
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2439 demanded
warring parties respect international law, ensuring safe
humanitarian operations. Yet there has not been high-
level international mobilization to reduce armed at-
tacks.TheDRC, facingelectionsonDecember23,hasnot
supported internationalizing the security response.
Consensus Recommendations
Anexpert consultation—with public health, humanitar-
ian, security, anthropology,andhumanrightsexpertise—
madethe followingrecommendations todeepenUSand
global engagement, while recognizing key security de-
tails are not public.
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First, through theUNSC, theUnitedStatesandallies shouldmo-
bilize high-level political attention and resources for the Ebola re-
sponse. Many lives are at risk if the epidemic is not rapidly con-
tained. TheSecurityCouncil shouldengageall parties, including the
DRC and African Union, to achieve mitigation of armed attacks by
the ADF and other militia; improved security for health workers;
a comprehensive aid package to communities; stronger prepared-
ness inneighboring states; andacontingencyplan to sustain the re-
sponse if securityworsens.USambassadors in the regionshoulduse
all diplomatic tools available to ensure the viability of the response.
Second, the US, along with allies and the UN, should develop a
plan to deploy public health personnel to North Kivu. It is in US na-
tional interests to control outbreaks before they escalate into a cri-
sis. The cost of addressing this epidemic now is far less than if mass
mobilization were required due to international spread of the virus.
The WHO and DRC have requested support from experienced per-
sonnel supportedbyUSagencies. CDCandUSAIDexperts could, for
example, be embedded in theWHO or other UN agencies. The plan
shouldincludeUSsecurityanddiplomaticresources,coordinatingwith
theUN, toassessand improvehealthworkersecurity.Lessonscanbe
drawn from humanitarian operations in unstable settings, including
northern Nigeria and South Sudan.
Third, US engagement should be closely coordinated with the
WHO and the national government. The WHO is the lead health
agency for containing potential PHEICs. When deploying US and
other countries’ resources in a conflict zone, an uncoordinated re-
sponse could be counterproductive. Strategic and operational en-
gagement, therefore, shouldbepartof aunified responsewithclear
coordinating authority, starting with the DRC andWHO.
Fourth, theUnited States should increase funding to theDRC to
enhance local response capabilities. Congolese health leaders have
much experience in containing Ebola outbreaks, but lack resources
to detect, assess, and respond.Manyhealthworkers are not reliably
compensated. African universities also have anthropology, commu-
nications, and health research capacities that could be resourced to
deploy. Engaging the Congolese diaspora and usingmobile commu-
nications for innovations in field epidemiology alsomaybe valuable.
Fifth,with theepidemic likely tocontinue formanymonths, the
US and WHO should immediately collaborate to expand the re-
sponseworkforce. Building on the CDC’s Field Epidemiology Train-
ing Program, the US andWHO should rapidly train and equipmore
health workers to sustain a prolonged Ebola response.
Sixth, longer term, the United States should craft a transpar-
ent framework for responding to epidemics in conflict zones. Risk
aversion can impede early, effective intervention that prevents
outbreaks from becoming crises. This is especially true when
US agencies represent a significant part of global disease
response capacity. The US, working proactively with partners,
should develop a transparent framework for assessing and
mitigating risk, balanced against the global public good of
preventing PHEICs.
Seventh, the US and international partners should ensure sus-
tainable funding fornational actionplans forhealth security. TheUS
helped launch the Global Health Security Agenda in 2014 to ex-
pand capacities in key countries and recently recommitted at the
GlobalHealth Security AgendaMinisterial in Indonesia. Investing in
preparedness is much less costly than crisis response and enables
burdensharing, “smart”diplomacy, local leadership, andpublic trust.
Eighth, theUNSCshouldcreateaplan tosafeguardpublichealth
action in conflict zones. In 2016, the UN secretary-general submit-
tedspecific recommendationstoprotecthealthworkersunderUNSC
resolution 2286, but the council has not acted. It is certain that the
UNwill becalledontoprovidesecurity in futurehealthcrises. Itmust
prepare andmaintain readiness for that eventuality.
Conclusions
The Ebola epidemic in the DRC has reached a dangerous moment,
requiringnewpolitical and security strategies. SupportingDRCand
WHOleadership, theUShascapabilities that shouldbecarefully and
responsibly deployed. From a humanitarian perspective, the CDC
andUSAIDhaveexperiencedpersonnelandkeycapacities thatcould
help prevent the epidemic from spreading regionally, whichwould
cost thousands of lives and devastate local economies. TheUS and
partners should also support theUNtoadapt andexpand its capac-
ity to safeguardhealthworkers and thepublic. This is the first Ebola
outbreak during which armed attacks impede the response, but it
will not be the last major health crisis amidst insecurity. The global
health playbookmust expand tomeet that reality.
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